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People have present-biased preferences: they choose more impatiently when choosing between an immediate reward and a
delayed reward, than when choosing between a delayed reward and a more delayed reward. Following McClure et al. [McClure,
S.M., Laibson, D.I., Loewenstein, G., Cohen, J.D. (2004). Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards.
Science, 306, 503.], we find that areas in the dopaminergic reward system show greater activation when a binary choice set
includes both an immediate reward and a delayed reward in contrast to activation measured when the binary choice set contains
only delayed rewards. The presence of an immediate reward in the choice set elevates activation of the ventral striatum,
pregenual anterior cingulate cortex and anterior medial prefrontal cortex. These dopaminergic reward areas are also responsive
to the identity of the recipient of the reward. Even an immediate reward does not activate these dopaminergic regions when the
decision is being made for another person. Our results support the hypotheses that participants show less affective engagement
(i) when they are making choices for themselves that only involve options in the future or (ii) when they are making choices for
someone else. As hypothesized, we also find that behavioral choices reflect more patience when choosing for someone else.
Keywords: present-biased preferences; intertemporal discounting; fMRI; multiple systems hypothesis
Offered the choice between two monetary rewards, most
people would prefer $10 today over $12 in a week, but pref-
erences typically switch when people are offered $10 in a year
or $12 in a year and a week (Ainslie, 1975). Examples like
this have led some researchers to argue that people have
dynamically inconsistent time preferences. Specifically,
people prefer to be ‘impatient’ when immediate gratification
is an option, but tend to be patient when making tradeoffs
between ‘future’ rewards (Ainslie, 1975). In this study we
examine whether such preference reversals also arise when
actors make intertemporal decisions for another person.
Decision-making for another person is an important topic
of study for two reasons. First, it sheds light on
decision-making mechanisms. For example, if time delay is
the only important characteristic of an intertemporal choice,
then moving a choice from the ‘own’ domain to the ‘other-
agent’ domain should not affect the outcome. However,
changing the domain may matter if choices for oneself trig-
ger different processes in the brain than choices for others.
For instance, for a smoker, foregoing a cigarette is affectively
different from advising someone else to quit.
Second, decision-making for another person has always
been widespread think of the leading example of parents
and minors and is becoming even more important.
Delegation from one adult to another is commonplace in
modern societies that are characterized by a high degree of
division of labor: for example, politicians represent the inter-
ests of their constituents, asset managers make decisions for
their investors, physicians make medical choices for their
patients and attorneys negotiate for their clients. Moreover,
delegated choices are likely to become even more important
as people live longer and declining health including cogni-
tive impairment force older adults to rely on their families
and other agents (like trustees, fiduciaries and physicians) to
make decisions on their behalf. Advanced medical directives
are just one important example of this ongoing trend.
In this article, we present an fMRI-study on brain correl-
ates of intertemporal choice for oneself or for another
person. Our study design is motivated by the hypothesis
that the degree to which a participant’s choice behavior for
herself is either patient or impatient arises from an interplay
of emotional and cognitive processes. It is not clear how
many processing systems are engaged in this interplay, but
some researchers have argued for two basic systems, which
are also sometimes referred to as hot- and cool- or System 1
and 2 (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Kahneman, 2003;
Mischel and Ayduk, 2003; McClure et al., 2007a;
Rustichini, 2008). In most of these dual-process theories, it
is assumed that the cool (reasoning) system is a deliberative,
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 slow, rule-governed and emotionally neutral system, which is
the seat of self-control, while the hot (affective) system is fast
and automatic, and prone to develop earlier in life
(Kahneman, 2003; Metcalfe and MIschel, 1999). The activa-
tion of the hot system is suggested to occur automatically
and to be imperfectly monitored by the cool system
(Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).
Thus, in the case of intertemporal decisions in which par-
ticipants need to trade off smaller, immediate rewards with
larger, later rewards, the hot system is assumed to typically
prefer immediate rewards, which promise instant gratifica-
tion, while the cool system may intervene to ‘argue’ for the
delayed, but larger option, which is more rewarding in the
long term (Mischel and Ayduk, 2003; Rustichini, 2008).
When the intertemporal choice concerns two differently
delayed rewards of which both are in the future, no imme-
diate gratification is possible, and hence relatively little en-
gagement of the hot system would be expected.
McClure et al. (2004) have investigated the neural basis of
intertemporal preferences for oneself and found that people,
offered the choice between a smaller, sooner and a larger,
later monetary reward, showed different neural activation
patterns depending on the date at which the earlier reward
was made available. Only choice sets including an immediate
reward were accompanied by strong activation in the dopa-
minergic reward system. However, all decisions generated
roughly similar levels of activation in the lateral prefrontal
and posterior parietal cortex, which are known for their in-
volvement in higher order cognitive functions. The authors
argue that this evidence supports the distinction between a
hot and a cool system, where the activation in the dopamin-
ergic reward system is the neural correlate of the hot (impa-
tient) system, and the lateral prefrontal and parietal
activation reflects the influence of the cool (patient)
system. However, the interpretations proposed by McClure
et al., have been disputed and the multiple systems hypoth-
esis remains speculative (Kable and Glimcher, 2007;
Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008).
A crucial question arising from the findings of McClure
et al. (2004) is whether the activation of separate neural
systems when immediate or only delayed rewards are avail-
able is a robust phenomenon that is independent of who is
the beneficiary of the rewards. As argued above, there are
many situations in everyday-life when people are responsible
for making decisions for others. There are reasons to assume
that decision-making for another person instead of for one-
self may have the property of generating less concern for
immediate gratification. Hence, having a third-party decide
may engender more patient decisions, particularly in the
presence of immediately available rewards.
Recent evidence provides support for this conjecture.
Ersner-Hershfield and colleagues (2009) have found a cor-
relation between activation in the pregenual anterior cingu-
late gyrus and behavioral discounting measures when
subjects make current-self-related judgments. No correlation
has been found, however, if subjects had to make judgements
about their future self, or current- or future-related judg-
ments about other persons. These results may carry over to
intertemporal choices with real consequences for oneself or
another person, such that choices for a current self are dif-
ferent from choices made for a future self, a current other or
a future other. Our study addresses this question.
Since behavioral studies on decision-making for oneself
and for other persons have often elicited non-congruent
choices (Borresen, 1987; Hsee and Weber, 2001; Stone
et al., 2002), Beisswanger et al. (2003) have suggested that
the degree of emotional involvement in a task might be a
decisive factor. The more one is emotionally involved in a
decision-making task when deciding for oneself, the larger
are the behavioral differences in decision-making for oneself
or for other persons. This is in line with the assumption that
decisions for other persons cause less emotional involve-
ment, hence making the difference larger between one’s
emotional arousal for decisions concerning oneself and de-
cisions concerning others. Hence, we hypothesize that there
is less affective- and reward-related neural activation
(McClure et al., 2004; 2007b) when choices including an
immediate option are made for another person compared
to choices made for oneself. We hypothesize that this will be
the case because of less personal involvement (Moran et al.,
2006) and thus no reward expectation (Knutson and
Peterson, 2005) and less emotional involvement (Grezes
et al., 2006) when making decisions for other persons.
Based on the findings by Beisswanger et al. (2003), we
further hypothesize that these activation differences will be
larger in impulsive participants i.e. participants who are
estimated to have relatively high short-run discount rates
when making choices for themselves as high short-run dis-
count rates are assumed to correspond to high levels of emo-
tional involvement (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; McClure
et al., 2004, 2007a and b). Behaviorally, we therefore
expect the most impulsive participants to show reductions
in impulsivity when their choices for other people are com-
pared to their choices for themselves. We do not expect to
observe a substantial difference between other- and own-
choices for participants with moderate levels of discounting.
METHODS
To test our predictions, we used the experiment developed
by McClure et al. (2004). Participants (28 total participants;
14 female) chose between a series of sooner-smaller and
later-larger rewards for themselves (SELF-condition) as
well as for another person (i.e. a stranger they would never
meet, OTHER-condition). In both the SELF and OTHER
conditions, there were some trials in which participants
chose between an immediate and a delayed reward (today
trials), and some trials in which participants chose between
two rewards that were both available in the future at differ-
ent delays (delay trials). The delay to the sooner-smaller
reward was either zero (in today trials) or 2 or 4 weeks (in
2o f8 S C A N(2 0 1 0 ) K. Albrecht etal.
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 delay trials). The amount of additional delay between the
sooner-smaller reward and the larger-later reward was
either 2 or 4 weeks.
Choices were presented in two parts (one for SELF and
one for OTHER), in an order balanced for receiver (SELF or
OTHER). Only after having made their decisions for the 40
individually pseudo-randomized binary-choice trials in the
first part, participants were informed about the rules of the
second part (where the condition changed from SELF to
OTHER or vice versa). At the end of the experiment, one
binary-choice trial from each part of the experiment was
randomly selected and the reward chosen by the participant
in that binary-choice trial was paid to the actual decision-
maker (in the case of a choice from the SELF-condition) or
to another person (in the case of a choice from the OTHER-
condition) at the appropriate delay time. All participants
also received a flat reward of E5 for making choices for
the other person, irrespective of what they chose. (See
Supplementary Data for further details.)
For the analysis we performed a median split of our
sample by how much participants discounted future rewards
when choosing for themselves (using the choices from the
SELF-condition). Specifically, we used a maximum likeli-
hood logit estimator to estimate the parameters of the
quasi-hyperbolic discount function (Laibson, 1997).
1 The
quasi-hyperbolic discount function parametrically captures
the preference for immediate gratification. This discount
function contains two critical parameters;  representing
the special discount factor that uniformly down-weights all
rewards that are not immediate rewards, and  representing
the general exponential discount factor that geometrically
discounts all rewards. Thus, the value of a reward u received
immediately is u. The discounted value vt of a reward u
received at delay t>0isvt ¼ 
tu.
We then split our sample into two groups, separating the
strong discounters (with s below the median) from the
moderate discounters (with s above the median; see
Supplementary Table S3 in the Supplementary Data).
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
To test our behavioral hypotheses, we carried out a
repeated-measurement analysis of variance (ANOVA) for
‘choice’ (percentage of times the sooner, but smaller
option was chosen), including the two-level within-subject
variables ‘receiver’ (SELF or OTHER) and ‘temporal dis-
tance’ (today trials, in which one of the two rewards was
available immediately, or delay trials, in which both rewards
were available in the future) as well as the between-subject
variable type (moderate or strong discounters). The analysis
yielded a main effect of ‘temporal distance’, with the sooner
option chosen significantly more often in today than in delay
trials [F(1,26)¼34.93, P<0.001; Figure 1A]. The compari-
son further revealed a main effect of the between-subject
variable type [F(1,26)¼9.12, P¼0.005], which supports
our division of participants into strong and weak discount-
ers. There was no main effect of receiver [F(1,27)¼0.481,
P¼0.494], but a significant interaction of type and receiver
[F(1,26)¼5.61, P¼0.026]. Paired-sample t-tests revealed
that only participants who strongly discounted future re-
wards chose the sooner option for themselves more often
than for the other person [t(13)¼ 2.34, P¼0.036,
Figure 1B). A further analysis showed that this difference
was significant, though, only for today trials. This confirms
our hypothesis by showing that strongly discounting partici-
pants became more patient in the OTHER-condition by
choosing more frequently the larger, but later reward in
today trials [t(13)¼3.18, P¼0.007]. There were no such
choice differences between SELF and OTHER in delay
trials [t(13)¼1.45, P¼0.170, Figure 1C]. In other words,
moving from the SELF to the OTHER task did not affect
trials in which subjects were choosing between two delayed
options.
Using the same independent variables as above, a
repeated-measurement ANOVA of ‘response time’ con-
firmed a main effect of ‘temporal distance’, with participants
choosing faster when an immediate reward was available
[F(1,26)¼12.33, P¼0.002; Figure 1D). No interaction
effect could be shown, i.e. this response time difference
was found for both strong and moderate discounters.
IMAGING RESULTS
Single subject contrast images generated for every participant
were entered into a second-level analysis on the basis of
Bayesian statistics (Neumann, 2003). In this approach, pos-
terior probability maps and maps of the effect size are cal-
culated on the basis of the resulting least-squares estimates of
parameters for the general linear model (GLM). The output
of the Bayesian second-level analysis is a probability map
showing the probability that the contrast is greater than
zero. For visualization, a threshold of 99% was applied to
the probability maps.
We investigated the hemodynamic response elicited by all
trials that include an immediate option (today trials) in con-
trast to all trials without an immediate option (delay trials),
separately for choices made for SELF and OTHER.
In SELF, we found higher hemodynamic activity for
choices including an immediate reward within the pregenual
anterior cingulate cortex (pACC, BA 32), ventral striatum,
anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), and anterior and
posterior precuneus (Figure 2A).
In OTHER, there was no higher hemodynamic activity for
choices including an immediate option within any of these
areas (Figure 2B).
1We use this quasi-hyperbolic model instead of other proposed models of time preference (Samuelson, 1937;
Koopmans, 1960; Green et al., 1994), because the quasi-hyperbolic model has been found to fit experimental
data well and is consistent with the two-systems approach (McClure et al., 2004). However, in order to check
robustness, we have also estimated a hyperbolic function 1/(1þkt). A median split of subjects based on the
hyperbolic function yields the same group assignments (into more and less impulsive subjects) as the quasi
hyperbolic function, except for two subjects switching groups. Also note that the correlation between  in the
quasi-hyperbolic model and k in the hyperbolic model is very high and significant (Spearman’s rho ¼  0.79,
P < 0.0001).
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 To analyse the interaction of differences between today
and delay trials with the differences between SELF and
OTHER, we calculated an interaction contrast of ‘temporal
distance’ (today vs delay trials) with receiver (SELF vs
OTHER). We found activation differences in the pACC,
aMPFC and ventral striatum (Figure 2C).
To test for whether today trials for SELF are really special
and are showing higher activations than any other condition,
these areas were subjected to a further post hoc analysis.
Figure 2D shows the mean parameter estimates (i.e. param-
eters from the GLM) of the different conditions, indicating
that the most elevated activation usually took place during
choices for SELF in today trials.
The only significant differences in our regions of inter-
est between the SELF and OTHER conditions (in either dir-
ection) arose from the interaction with immediacy. No
activation differences in these regions were found when con-
trasting choices made for SELF with choices made for
OTHER in general.
We also wanted to identify hemodynamic activity differ-
ences within these regions depending on how patiently or
impatiently participants were choosing in the SELF-
condition. Hence, we again carried out the aforementioned
analyses of contrasting today trials with delay trials, this time
for participants with high and low discount values
separately.
For participants who strongly discounted future rewards,
we found higher hemodynamic activity for today trials com-
pared to delay trials in SELF in the pACC, aMPFC, ventral
striatum and anterior and posterior precuneus. However,
when looking at the same contrast for more patient partici-
pants (who discounted future rewards only weakly) elevated
activity within the network was not observed.
In the OTHER condition, high-discounting participants
showed almost no elevated activation in the areas that
were activated in the SELF condition, but only showed an
elevated activity within the right MPFC.
An interaction contrast of temporal distance and receiver
for participants who strongly discounted future rewards
yielded the following activation areas: the pACC, aMPFC,
ventral striatum and anterior precuneus. Most elevations
took place only when choices for SELF were made in today
trials (Figure 3A).
An interaction contrast of ‘temporal distance’ and
‘receiver’ for moderate-discounting participants yielded no
such neural activation differences (Figure 3B).
It is noteworthy that we performed another robustness
check by implementing a different median split of subjects,
using the parameter  based on choices for the OTHER
condition. Based on this classification of impulsive and
non-impulsive discounters (for other subjects) we then
checked whether neural activation in the SELF condition
Fig. 1 (A) Choice of sooner option significantly differs for today and delay trials [F(1,27)¼33.62, P<0.001]. (B) Strong discounters significantly more often chose the sooner
reward for SELF than for OTHER [t(13)¼ 2.34, P¼0.036]. (C) Strong discounters chose the sooner reward in SELF significantly more often than in OTHER only in today trials
[t(13)¼3.18, P¼0.007]. (D) Response time is significantly shorter in today trials [F(1,27)¼9.12, P¼0.005). *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001; error bars represent
standard errors (SE)].
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 differed when comparing the impulsive (low ) and
non-impulsive (high ) participants. We found no signifi-
cant differences. This implies that impulsiveness when
choosing for OTHER does not predict brain activation
when choices are made for oneself.
DISCUSSION
When analysing choice sets including an immediate reward
for SELF, we found an activated network of brain areas
thought to be engaged in emotion- and reward-related pro-
cesses (McClure et al., 2004, 2007b). Specifically, the ventral
striatum, pACC and aMPFC were found to be especially
activated for choices in today trials made for oneself com-
pared to either choices made for another person or to
choices made in delay trials for oneself (Figure 3). From
these findings we conclude that choices for SELF involving
an immediate option differentially activate an affective brain
network. This network is implicated in choices associated
with the possibility of immediate gratification of one’s own
needs.
With respect to the involvement of the ventral striatum in
emotion-driven processes such as opting for immediate re-
wards, note that the ventral striatum has been found to have
strong reciprocal connections to neurons in the midbrain
dopamine system (Schultz et al., 1997; Breiter et al., 2001).
The midbrain dopamine system is thought to play a role in
reward-dependent learning (Schultz et al., 1997).
Furthermore, findings of imaging studies suggest that the
ventral striatum is also activated by reward anticipation
(Knutson et al., 2001) and that this activation is higher for
more immediate rewards compared to more delayed ones
(McClure et al., 2004).
Like the ventral striatum, the ACC receives rich dopamin-
ergic innervations, which indicates that it may be involved in
reward-related processes (Gaspar et al., 1989; Schultz, 1998).
Based on cytoarchitectural, lesion, electrophysiological and
imaging studies, the ACC has been divided into subregions,
Fig. 2 (A) Brain regions that were activated by choices containing an immediate option compared to choices with only delayed options in SELF. (B) There were no such
activation differences between today and delay trials in OTHER. (C) An interaction contrast of temporal distance (today vs delay trials) and receiver (SELF vs OTHER) showed
activation differences within the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), ventral striatum (vStr) and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC). (For visualization, a threshold of
99% was applied to the probability maps.) (D) Parameter estimates indicate that these activation differences were mainly due to elevated activation in today trials in SELF,
whereas in all other conditions activation in these brain areas was similarly low.
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 with the ventral ones being responsible for the processing of
emotions, such as happiness, sadness and fear (Bush et al.,
2000; Vogt, 2005). Among other areas, the emotional part
has connections to the nucleus accumbens of the ventral
striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (Devinsky et al., 1995),
both also found to be activated by reward-related stimuli
(Knutson et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2004; Winstanley
et al., 2004). The elevated activity associated with the inter-
action of SELF and today trials was located in the pregenual
ACC, which is an area in the ventral part of the ACC, an-
terior to the genu of the corpus callosum. This part of the
ACC has been found to be engaged in decisions involving
gambles containing large gains (Rogers et al., 2004) and has
also been associated with happy emotions (Vogt, 2005).
We also observe heightened aMPFC activation for today
trials in the SELF condition. The MPFC is active in
self-related judgments (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al.,
2002; Ochsner et al., 2004), thought and attention
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). It has also been found to be
involved in the processing of externally and internally cued
emotions (Lane et al., 1997, 1998). It has been suggested
therefore that the MPFC might be engaged in identifying
and evaluating positive emotions (Drevets and Raichle,
1998). In our study, this region showed more activation
when participants chose a reward for themselves instead of
for another person. The MPFC’s higher engagement also in
today trials shows that participants were more self-focused
when there was an immediate option, and possibly more
engaged with their own happy emotions towards immediate
rewards, perhaps evaluating how good exactly such immedi-
ate gratification would feel.
These findings are consistent with behavioral results by
Sayette and colleagues (2008), who reported that participants
in a low-craving state for cigarettes underestimated future
craving, suggesting a cold-to-hot empathy gap: participants
could not empathize with a future self and hence not cor-
rectly predict future states and preferences they would hold
in these states. Differences in neural activation concerning
choices for a present and a future self could be responsible
for this empathy gap.
When looking at choices made for another person, we also
found results in accordance with our hypothesis: There were
no ROI differences between today and delay trials when
choices were made for another person. Furthermore, there
were no such neural activation differences in delay trials
between choices made for oneself and choices made for an-
other person. In sum, the choices made in today trials for
OTHER seem not to be based on the same emotions and
Fig. 3 Contrast values and brain regions with activation differences in the interaction contrast (temporal distance receiver)( A) for strong and (B) moderate discounters.
(For visualization, a threshold of 99% was applied to the probability maps.)
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 reward expectations that were engaged by SELF trials. Our
behavioral hypotheses were also supported by our results.
Participants who strongly discounted future rewards chose
the immediate option more often in SELF than in OTHER,
which is consistent with the findings in Beisswanger et al.
(2003), who assume that behavioral differences in
decision-making for SELF and OTHER are greater the
greater the emotional involvement of the participants.
Hence, while strong discounters act highly impatiently
when choosing immediate rewards for themselves, they act
more patiently when choosing for another person.
However, looking at the imaging results when comparing
today with delay trials for OTHER in strongly discounting
participants, we do not find neural activation that explains
why the sooner, smaller reward was still preferred to the
later, larger reward more often in today than in delay
trials. The same is true for comparing today and delay
trials of moderately discounting participants both in SELF
and OTHER. Thus, although strongly discounting partici-
pants chose more patiently for the other person than for
themselves, they still chose dynamically inconsistently for
the other person, as did moderately discounting participants.
One explanation is related to the manner in which decisions
are taken in the two different conditions. The activation
within the aMPFC and precuneus, which was found to be
responsible for mostly self-related episodic memory retrieval
and evaluation (Zysset et al., 2002; Addis et al., 2004), sug-
gests that in SELF there was a new evaluation based on the
question what was preferred ‘right now’ before ‘every
choice’, while in OTHER participants might have employed
another more general strategy that did not rely on a repeated
evaluation of what the other person might have preferred.
This conjecture could not be evaluated with the present
experiment, though, but it seems plausible and in keeping
with our behavioral and neural findings, implying a need for
additional research.
Addressing possible limitations of our study it is, first,
important to consider the perception of ‘today’ in SELF
and OTHER. While ‘today’ in SELF is clearly identified as
the end of the experimental session, ‘today’ in OTHER was
specified slightly differently for logistical reasons. In the ex-
perimental instructions for OTHER it was stated that the
other person is ‘a participant in a subsequent experimental
session’. The instructions go on to say that: ‘in each choice,
you will have to choose between two amounts of money.
Importantly, with every choice, you will simultaneously
with the amount of money select a date, at which the
other person will receive this amount: there are four possible
payment dates: (i) today, (ii) in 2 weeks, (iii) in 4 weeks or
(iv) in 6 weeks. If you choose the amount with the date
‘‘today’’, the other person will receive the money immedi-
ately after her experimental session. If you choose an amount
with the date (ii), (iii) or (iv), the other person will receive
the money at the selected date’. In our view, this leaves the
subject with the strong impression that the other subject will
receive rewards today if that is what the original subject
chooses. In fact, for 24 out of 28 participants the subsequent
session for the OTHER subject took place later on the very
same day. In four cases, however, it was not possible to do
so, and in these cases the session for the OTHER subject took
place on the next day. We can not rule out the possibility
that there may have been some ambiguity about what sub-
jects perceived when thinking about ‘today’ for themselves vs
‘today’ for the OTHER subject. Future work should clarify
whether it makes a difference if a participant is explicitly told
that the other person is participating on the same day (and
in that case the experiment would be run so that this out-
come is indeed guaranteed).
Another limitation is that our experimental design is not
suited to resolve the issue of whether decision-making is
driven by a unitary processing system or by multiple pro-
cessing systems in the brain. Hare et al. (2009) investigate
experimentally the appliance of self-control, though their
work does not resolve this issue. Rustichini (2008) provides
a review of the evidence on both sides of the debate.
To conclude, our main results imply that the processes
underlying intertemporal choices that involve immediate re-
wards for oneself are different from processes underlying the
evaluation of immediate rewards for others. Activations in
emotion- and reward-related brain areas suggest that affect-
ive processes occur primarily when immediate gratification
for oneself is possible. Making decisions for another person
does not elicit activation in reward-related brain areas, ex-
plaining why in particular impulsive participants choose
relatively patiently when making decisions for others.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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